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Abstract 
This essay introduces a tension between the public Wittgenstein’s 
optimism about knowledge of other minds and the private 
Wittgenstein’s pessimism about understanding others. There are three 
related reasons which render the tension unproblematic. First, the 
barriers he sought to destroy were metaphysical ones, whereas those 
he struggled to overcome were psychological. Second, Wittgenstein’s 
official view is chiefly about knowledge while the unofficial one is about 
understanding. Last, Wittgenstein’s official remarks on understanding 
themselves fall into two distinct categories that don’t match the focus 
of his unofficial ones. One is comprised of those remarks in the 
Investigations that challenge the thought that understanding is an inner 
mental process. The other consists primarily of those passages in PPF 
and On Certainty concerned with the difficulty of understanding others 
without immersing oneself into their form of life. In its unofficial 
counterpart, Wittgenstein focuses on individuals, rather than collectives. 
The official and the unofficial sets of remarks are united in assuming a 
distinction between understanding a person and understanding the 
meaning of their words. If to understand a language is to understand a 
form of life, then to understand a person is to understand a whole life. 
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* * * 
The older I get the more I realize how terribly difficult it is for people 
to understand each other, and I think that what misleads one is the 
fact that they all look so much like each other. If some people looked 
like elephants and others like cats, or fish, one wouldn’t expect them to 
understand each other and things would look much more like what 
they really are. 
Wittgenstein, Letter to P. Sraffa, 23 August, 1949 
Here is a tin of ground white pepper and with no such thing as a 
pepper mill in the house I wonder how we could ever have hoped to 
understand one another when we even use different kinds of pepper. 
Alan Bennett, Cocktail Sticks, p.80 
Prologue 
Interpreters of different spots and stripes all agree that the later 
Wittgenstein is an enemy of the idea that the thoughts and feelings 
of other people – and by extension animals – are hidden from us in 
any sense that might raise a serious philosophical problem of other 
minds. Whatever the precise details of his view, it seems clear that 
Wittgenstein doesn’t think there is any general epistemic worry to 
be had about others: 
If we are using the word 'to know' as it is normally used (and how else 
are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in 
pain. (PI § 246) 
On this view, there is no metaphysical barrier to knowledge of 
others, the overcoming of which would require some kind of 
argument from analogy à la Russell (PI §420ff. – which forms a 
bridge with the remarks on seeing-as in PPF- xi). In the Philosophical 
Investigations this stance is primarily expressed in related to 
knowledge of sensations, inner speech, beliefs, and intentions. 
Following Norman Malcolm (1986), we may see it as part of a 
much wider attack on the traditional philosophical assumption that 
all sorts of interesting things are systematically hidden from us (i.e. 
necessarily “private”), be they the essences of things, functions of 
words, or the minds of people (PI §§ 92, 133, 155, 293, 301, 307, 
323-4, 435, & 559). 
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It would be natural to therefore expect Wittgenstein’s remarks 
on understanding to follow the same general train of thought as those 
on knowledge, not least because the verbs “to know” and “to 
understand” may be used interchangeably in various contexts. 1 
Such expectations are met to the extent that Wittgenstein sees no 
metaphysical obstacle to everyday cases of understanding other 
people. Nonetheless, his writings create two distinct moments for 
pause here. 
First, we have the famous pair of passages – and their various 
cousins across the Nachlass – in which Wittgenstein speaks of the 
tribe with which we cannot find our feet, and the lion who we could 
not understand even if it spoke English (PPF § 327). Second, there 
is an extensive range of biographical material demonstrating that in 
his personal life Wittgenstein not only found it almost impossible 
to either understand many other people or be understood by them, 
but maintained that this is typical of the human condition. I shall 
refer to the first as his official view and the second as the unofficial 
one, in which I include remarks from Culture & Value as these “do 
not belong directly with his philosophical texts” (von Wright, 
preface to CV). In the case of the latter, I give particular focus to 
two letters from Wittgenstein to Sraffa as a study case of a wider 
phenomenon in his life.  
I aim to show that although Wittgenstein is indeed marking 
some valuable distinctions between knowledge and understanding 
which analytic philosophers have neglected at their peril, we should 
favour interpretations of his official view according to which our 
understanding of others is as commonplace as our knowledge of 
their thoughts and feelings. While this is in some prima facie tension 
with his unofficial view, it is ultimately not only compatible with it, 
but a significant supplement to it. Or so I shall be arguing by 
suggesting that his official remarks on the role played by forms of 
life in our understanding of certain groups of people is mirrored by a 
concern with the relation of entire lives to our understanding of 
specific individuals. 
                                                          
1 For different uses of the word “understanding” and their relation to both knowledge 
and explanation see Hertzberg (2005). 
Constantine Sandis  CC-BY 
 134 
I. The Official View: Tribes and Lions 
The later Wittgenstein’s official remarks on understanding largely 
occur in four contexts: (a) PI §§ 138-182, (c) PPF §§ 326ff., (c) LW 
§§190-98, and (d) remarks in On Certainty about what to make of 
certain peculiar – often philosophical – utterances (§§ 32, 157, 526, 
& 563).2 The stance found across these occasions is sufficiently 
unified to render switching back and forth between them seamless. 
It is nonetheless worth considering the first set of these remarks in 
relative isolation, as their primary focus is not on understanding 
others but on the relation of meaning to use. Wittgenstein is here 
combatting the view that understanding the meaning of a word is 
an inner mental process of some kind. Here is a typical passage: 
What really comes before our mind when we understand a word? Isn’t it 
something like a picture? Can’t it be a picture? Well, suppose that a 
picture does come before your mind when you hear the word “cube”, 
say the drawing of a cube. In what way can this picture fit or fail to fit 
a use of the word “cube”? Perhaps you say: “It’s quite simple; if that 
picture occurs to me and I point to a triangular prism for instance, and 
say it is a cube, then this use of the word doesn’t fit the picture.”  But 
doesn’t it fit? I have purposely so chosen the example that it is quite 
easy to imagine a method of projection according to which the picture 
does fit after all. The picture of the cube did indeed suggest a certain use 
to us, but it was also possible for me to use it differently. (PI §139) 
These thoughts slowly morph into his discussion of rule-following 
(§§140ff.), the connecting thread being that the ability to follow a 
rule is an ability to understand or grasp how one is meant to carry on. 
I do not propose to defend a particular exegetical account here, but 
merely to note the obvious connection between understanding a 
rule and knowing how to go on: 
Suppose I now ask: “Has he understood the system if he continues the 
series to the hundredth place?” … Perhaps you will say here: to have 
got the system (or again, to understand it) can’t consist in continuing 
the series up to this or that number: that is only applying one’s 
                                                          
2 On Certainty also continues, in the context of giving grounds and persuading, the theme 
of understanding other cultures, which Wittgenstein first explored in his Remarks on 
Frazer’s Golden Bough (e.g. OC §609-12). Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2007:136) helpfully 
distinguishes here between “localized” forms of life and the single “human” form of life.  
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understanding. Understanding itself is a state which is the source of the 
correct use….When I say I understand the rule of a series, I’m surely 
not saying so on the basis of the experience of having applied the 
algebraic formula in such-and-such a way! In my own case at any rate, 
I surely know that I mean such-and-such a series, no matter how far 
I’ve actually developed it.” So you mean that you know the application 
of the rule of the series quite apart from remembering actual 
applications to particular numbers. And you’ll perhaps say: “Of 
course! For the series is infinite, and the bit of it that I could develop 
finite.” … But what does this knowledge consist in? Let me ask: When 
do you know that application? Always? Day and night? Or only while 
you are actually thinking of the rule of the series? Do you know it, that 
is, in the same way as you know the alphabet and the multiplication 
table? Or is what you call ‘knowledge’ a state of consciousness or a 
process say a thinking-of-something, or the like? (PI §§146-8) 
Wittgenstein’s reservations about the kind of knowledge that his 
imagined interlocutor has in mind do not preclude him from 
identifying the understanding of rules with a form of knowledge, 
namely that which Ryle baptized as “know-how”.3 But we should 
not conclude from this that he takes the words “knowledge” and 
“understanding” to be interchangeable. Far from it: 
The criteria which we accept for ‘fitting’, ‘being able to’, 
‘understanding’, are much more complicated than might appear at first 
sight. That is, the game with these words, their use in the linguistic 
intercourse that is carried on by their means, is more involved; the role 
of these words in our language is other than we are tempted to think. 
(PI §182) 
I return to the distinction between knowledge and 
understanding in § IV. Before doing so I wish to first look at his 
more private remarks on understanding certain people (§ II), and 
then explore how these relate to his official remarks on the role 
played by forms of life in understanding collectives (§ III). 
                                                          
3 I remain neutral here on whether knowledge-how (or, indeed, understanding-how) is, in 
actual fact, always reducible to knowledge-that (or understanding-that). What interests me 
is Wittgenstein’s own conception of the relation between different forms of 
understanding and knowledge (see note 24 below). 
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II. The Unofficial View: Endless Personal 
Misunderstandings 
What we might reasonably refer to as Wittgenstein’s pessimism 
regarding the possibility of understanding others manifests itself in 
his private correspondence, as in this typical letter to C.L. 
Stevenson, dated 22 December 1933: 
Really to understand other peoples [sic] thoughts or to learn from 
their confusions is enormously difficult, especially if they lived long ago 
and talked a philosophical language which isn’t your own. The only 
thing to do is to tell yourself that you don’t understand what exactly they were 
at. If you’ve ever had a real thought yourself you’ll know that it is 
difficult for you to understand other peoples [sic] thoughts. I know 
that, as a professor of philosophy, you’ve got to profess to understand 
what everyone meant when they said…But you aren’t a professor, and 
so just enjoy your freedom! (McGuinness 2012: 67, p.103) 
The above is very explicitly phrased in terms of understanding 
other people’s thoughts and words. How Wittgenstein takes this to 
both relate to – and differ from – understanding other people 
themselves (qua people, as it were) is part of what I wish to explore in 
this essay. What is clear is that he was privately pessimistic about 
both possibilities. This attitude culminates in the second of two 
consecutive letters to Sraffa, written on the 23rd of August 1949. I 
quote it at some length, though not in full, and shall momentarily 
return to the social context in which it was written:4 
I have very slowly in my life come to the conviction that some people 
cannot make themselves understood to each other, or at least only in a very 
narrowly circumscribed field. If this happens each is inclined to think 
that the other doesn’t want to understand, and there are ENDLESS 
misunderstandings. This of course doesn’t improve the friendliness of 
                                                          
4
 Sraffa’s mother had died on 25 June and upon hearing that Wittgenstein hadn’t sent 
Sraffa his condolences von Wright urged him to immediately call him, only to hear 
Wittgenstein say “I did not write because what happened didn’t mean anything to me” – 
whereas (he claims in the letter that von Wright may have subsequently advised him to 
write) what he had “very clumsily” said “I did not not write because what happened didn’t 
mean anything to me”. In this first letter (dated 11/7/49; McGuiness (2012: 409, p.449).) 
Wittgenstein optimistically tells Sraffa “you knew exactly how I felt”. This adds poignancy 
to the deep pessimism of his next letter, a reply to a letter by Sraffa that Wittgenstein 
characterizes as not really calling for a reply. 
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the intercourse. I could go into details about us, but I don’t want to. 
The general situation however is often this that one man thinks that 
the other could understand if he only wanted to, hence he gets rude, 
or nasty (according to the temperament) and thinks that he is only 
kicking back, and so it starts. – 
In order to understand why it’s impossible, or almost impossible, for 
certain people to understand each other, one has to think not of the 
few occasions on which they meet, but of the differences of their whole 
lives; and there can be nothing more different than your interests and 
mine, and your movements of thought and mine. Only by a real tour 
de force was it possible for us to talk to each other years ago when we 
were younger. And if I were to compare you to a mine in which I 
worked to get some precious ore, I must say that my labour was 
extremely hard; though also that what I got out of it was well worth the 
labour. But later, when we no longer could give each other anything 
(which does not mean that each of us had got all the other had), it was 
natural that only an almost complete lack of understanding should 
remain; and, at least on my part, for a long time a wish that an 
understanding should again be possible (McGuiness 2012: 410, p.450). 
The letter is followed by a striking postscript, quoted in its 
entirety at the outset of this essay. In both the letter’s main body 
and his postscript to it, Wittgenstein is not making a general claim 
about understanding others, but a qualified one about 
understanding certain others. The word certain here is itself 
ambiguous as it could refer to either certain types of individual or to 
specific individuals, be they considered as being sui generis or qua 
falling under a type. The following remark, written just over a year 
earlier, favours the thought that what he has in mind are specific 
people that fall under recognizable types: 
It’s important for our view of things that someone may feel 
concerning certain people that their inner life [was in ihnen vorgeht] will 
always be a mystery to him. That he will never understand them. 
(Englishwomen in the eyes Europeans.) (CV, p.74e [July 9, 1948]). 
The idea resembles the commonplace one that people with 
different backgrounds have greater difficulty in understanding one 
another than those who share a certain culture, mindset, and 
experiences. What is odd is the incongruity of the remark with 
Wittgenstein’s philosophies of mind and knowledge e.g. as 
expressed in PI §§ 138-182, discussed in § I above. In particular, 
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the feeling that one might never understand what is going on inside 
(viz. the inner life of) another person is one naturally attributed to 
Wittgenstein’s interlocutor. Of course Wittgenstein is not here 
endorsing such feelings, merely reporting their occurrence.  
It is of utmost importance the lives of others are not 
metaphysically hidden from us. In his Last Writings on the Philosophy 
of Psychology, Wittgenstein warns against the error of thinking that 
people we find mysterious would become crystal clear to us if only 
we could see their hidden thoughts: 
Even if someone were to express everything that is 'within him', we 
wouldn't necessarily understand him […] Think of how puzzling a 
dream is. Such a riddle doesn't have to have a solution. It intrigues us. 
It is as if there were a riddle here. This could be a primitive reaction. It 
is as if there were a riddle here; but it doesn't have to be a riddle […] 
He behaves like a man in whom complicated thought processes are 
taking place; and if only I understand them I would understand him.--
Let us imagine this case; and now he is reciting his thoughts to himself, 
and in a certain sense I understand his actions. That is, I see the trains 
of thought and I know how they lead to his actions. In this way he 
would cease being a riddle to me. (LW § 191ff5) 
As with philosophical problems, we must accept that there need 
not be a hidden truth waiting to be discovered. And when there is, 
it is not to be gotten by peering inside another person’s mind (or 
soul), for this really wouldn’t get one far at all: 
If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see 
there whom we were speaking of (PPF §278). 
The connection Wittgenstein is in fact interested in is that between 
the near-impossibility of understanding certain others and 
significant differences between entire lives. His realization that this 
is not only true of “other others” but equally so of those closest to 
us did not fall out of any philosophical picture, it was a personal 
truth which Wittgenstein reluctantly came to accept over the years. 
This could explain why he eventually trusted his philosophical ideas 
to those friends and lovers whom he shared his life with much more 
than to his academic peers. 
                                                          
5 Thanks to Ian Ground for bringing these remarks to my attention. 
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Part of Wittgenstein’s disappointment with Sraffa and others 
could be that he took himself to share a great number of things 
(e.g. a certain intellectual disposition) with them, only to discover 
that it wasn’t enough. It is not too far-fetched to think that his 
friendships with Sraffa and Russell ended, from Wittgenstein’s 
point of view at least, not because of intellectual differences of 
opinion, but because of the complete inability of each of the two 
parties to understand the other. Whatever the personal truth, 
presumably one could replace “Englishwomen” and “Europeans” 
with any number of nouns referring to non-geographical 
communities such as “Catholics”, “intellectuals”, “scientists”, 
“builders”, “nurses”, “schoolchildren”, “botanists”, “addicts”, 
“Wittgensteinians”, or whatever. And in each case various 
qualifications and further distinctions will need to be made.6  
So we might take the message of his postscript to be something 
like this: if only members of each different groups of like-minded 
people who could understand each other (be they “Catholics”, 
“Europeans”, or a considerably more complex grouping akin to the 
hybrid creatures of Greek mythology) resembled one-another but 
looked strikingly different from the members of other groups (so 
some would look like elephants and some like fish) then we would 
have a better idea of who is more likely to understand us and vice 
versa.  So understood, it is not that each and every one of us would 
look substantially different but that certain sorts of people would. 
Of course this may already be true to some extent (e.g. 
Mediterraneans are as a rule of thumb much shorter and darker 
than Scandinavians), but Wittgenstein has far more radical physical 
differences and spiritual similarities in mind. “Don’t judge a book 
by its cover” warns the cliché. “People need better covers”, 
Wittgenstein effectively retorts.  
The Persian philosopher and historian Ibn Miskawayh, writing 
about the “science” of physiognomy, states that “[i]f a person’s 
temperament and physical build have an affinity to ... a rabbit, one 
judges [or concludes] that he possesses its character, and if they 
                                                          
6 In Sandis 2012 I tried to show how this all sheds an interesting light on the “we” in the 
lion remark. Could this “we” refer to a collective of people who would be better 
represented by different kinds of heads? 
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have an affinity to a lion, one judges [or concludes] that he 
possesses its character” (Al-Tawhidi & Miskawayh 1951: 170). 7  
This may seem silly to us, and perhaps it is, but it is worth recalling 
here the instructive parallels Alasdair MacIntyre (1972) has set 
between the methodology and findings of the far more ludicrous 
pseudoscience of phrenology and those of neuroscience. 
At a slightly more intuitive level, many Southern Africans 
traditionally use totems to identify the various clans which make up 
the historical dynasties of their civilization. The Shona people of 
Zimbabwe, for example, use animal and body-part  “mitupo” such 
as of those of Monkey (Soko), Antelope (Mhara), Lion (Shumba), 
Zebra (Mbizi/Tembo), Leopard (Nhewa/Ingwe), Fish (Hove), 
Eagle (Shiri/Hungwe), Hippo (dziva), Buffalo (Nyati), Python 
(SHyto), Elephant (Nzou), Heart (moyo), Lung (Bepe), Male 
Genetalia (Tsiwo), and Eland (Mhofu). 8   Importantly, for our 
purposes, totems are also meant to serve as indication of character 
traits associated with each clan, such as bravery or kindness. This 
may still seem very “primitive”, since clearly one can exhibit 
character traits that are not prevalent in one’s social group. But it is 
no more primitive than talking of British politeness and stiff upper 
lip, Germany efficiency, French elegance, and so on. And let us 
also not forget that people who live together – share lives - for long 
periods of time end up looking like each other, if only because they 
adopt one another’s mannerisms and facial gestures. 
There is some truth in such generalisations, even if it cannot be 
extracted to fit each particular example. Since one’s character is 
very much influenced by that of the society one is brought up in, 
it’s no wonder that we understand others without some 
understanding of their whole life. Here it is prudent to note that 
not only does understanding come in degrees but that one can also 
fully understand another in one respect, and not at all in some 
other. I may, for example, fully get your politics but be left 
                                                          
7 I owe this reference and translation to Sophia Vasalou. 
8 These are often further broken down into gendered names which may also serve as 
family names; people of the same totem are descendants of one common ancestor and as 
such forbidden to have any intimate relationship, thereby preventing clanism (but creating 
serious difficulties for orphans of unknown origin).  
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completely cold by your appreciation of a certain musical artist. 
(There is a difference between not understanding something 
specific about a person and not understanding them period.)  
Wittgenstein seems uninterested in such subtleties here, but we 
should not infer from this that he would not be open to them. He 
implies, for instance, that someone can only be an enigma if there 
are others that I can understand: 
He is incomprehensible to me means that I cannot relate to him as to 
others. (LW §198)9 
Moreover, Wittgenstein’s general stance on mutual understanding 
in keep with our practice of finding the lowest common 
denominator (hunger, thirst, bus timetables, the weather) when 
conversing with people that are completely unlike us in other 
respects. 10  And even then, approaches to food and so on can be 
so different from our own that the gulf is much larger than the 
common ground. This brings us to the concept of a shared form of 
life. Wittgenstein adopted the term “form of life” (which only 
occurs six times in his published output) to refer to “the 
intertwining of culture, world-view, and language”, including 
“patterns of behavior” (Glock 1996: 124-5).11 Failure to understand 
another, it might therefore seem, results from the lack of a shared 
form of life. 
III. Collective and Individual Forms of Life 
As P.M.S. Hacker notes in his essay in this volume, the widespread 
use of the phrase “form of life” in 19th and early 20th century 
literature had become “humdrum” by the time of the Investigations. 
                                                          
9 I spare the reader the usual rehearsal of possible isolation scenarios, from Mowgli to 
Robinson Crusoe.  
10 With non-human animals we share such things as birth, death, sexual relations, hunger, 
and thirst, but not marriage, religion, and so on (cf. Vico 1725: 77, Berlin 1974: 344,  
Winch 1964:43 & 47). Whether animals have language is a moot point, but Wittgenstein’s 
lion remark demonstrates that it is not a crucial one. Rhees claims that between animals 
“there is no question of understanding here, any more than there is a question of 
discussion” (2006: 148). This seems to me to be utterly wrong. 
11 The full list, considered in detail by Hacker (2015), is PI §§19, 23, & 241; MS 160, 51; 
PPF §§ 1 & 345. 
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One early use noted by Wittgenstein scholars is found in Eduard 
Spranger’s book Lebensformen, whose title refers to types of 
individual character; indeed the book is translated as Types of Men 
and not Forms of Life. These types are very crudely defined in ways 
which wouldn’t help members of group understand each other at 
all,12 but I nonetheless wish to suggest that there is a connection 
between Spranger’s use of “form of life” and Wittgenstein’s private 
writings on understanding certain people.13 
While the official Wittgenstein’s remarks about forms of life are 
about understanding entire communities of people, his personal 
remarks on understanding are about individuals. Wittgenstein uses 
“forms of life” to refer to regular forms of living (Hacker 2015: § 3), 
but we may wish to extend the concept to cover a particular 
individual’s unique – perhaps even irregular – way of living. So 
conceived, a form of life need not be an entire community’s way of 
living, but simply that of an individual. Inquiries into what makes 
another person tick are often highly personal. This is not to deny a 
continuum between certain difficulties we have in understanding 
individuals that are reasonably close to us, and people in other 
cultures (thus, I may have difficulty understanding the humour of a 
particular colleague or an entire community).14 
I‘m not concerned here with whether Wittgenstein ever used 
the expression this way as with introducing a new – but not 
unrelated – use of the phrase to indicate connections between his 
thoughts on understanding others in relation to (a) their 
communities and (b) their personal biographies. Understanding 
what Sraffa says, for example, is not just a matter of understanding 
how the words he speaks are used by other Italians. If “to imagine 
a language is to imagine a form of life” (PI §§19), does this not also 
apply to the language of a particular person? Not a private language 
                                                          
12 They are: (i) the Theoretical (who most values truth); (ii) the economic (who most 
values pragmatism); (iii) the Aesthetic (who most values harmony); (iv) the Social (who 
most values people people); (v) the Political (who most values power); (vi) The Religious 
(who most values unity). 
13 It is worth noting here that forms of life primarily lead to types of character, and not 
the other way round. 
14 I owe this point and example to Lars Hertzberg; see also Winch (1997). 
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in Wittgenstein’s technical sense, but the language of a particular 
person nonetheless.15 
Wittgenstein’s more personal remarks seem to suggest that 
different forms of life lead to different types of people to the point 
where it would be helpful if each type had a different animal head 
assigned to it.16 The much less plausible alternative understanding 
of Wittgenstein’s forms of life as “part of our inflexible biological 
human nature”17 sits uneasily with all the evidence we have been 
discussing so far. This is not to say that biological differences 
cannot underlie or enable cultural ones, but only that the everyday 
difficulty of understanding others is not based on biology any more 
than the lack of a philosophical problem of knowing other minds is 
due to biological sameness. 
It is wrong to think that we are forced to choose between a 
difference of forms of life that is purely biological and one that is 
merely cultural or ethnological. The criteria for the possibility of 
understanding are behavioural: 
[...] he [the explorer in the foreign land] can come to understand it [the 
foreign language] only through its connections with the rest of the life 
of the natives. What we call ‘instructions’, for example, or ‘orders’, 
‘questions’, ‘answers’, ‘describing’, etc. is all bound up with very 
specific human actions and an order is only distinguishable as an order 
by means of the circumstances preceding or following // 
accompanying it // (MS 165, pp. 97ff.; as quoted in Baker and Hacker 
1985:191 & 2009:177). 
Suppose you came as an explorer to an unknown country with a 
language quite unknown to you. In what circumstances would you say 
that the people there gave orders, understood them, obeyed them, 
rebelled against them, and so on? Shared human behaviour [Die 
                                                          
15
 Do Wittgenstein and Sraffa share a “localized” form of life? Only to some extent. This 
highlights the limit of the concept, which needs considerable stretching before it can do 
any real philosophical work. At this point we may wonder whether the expression is more 
of a hindrance than a help, if we need to appeal to things we already get to explain it. 
16  Wittgenstein refers to “human types” in CV (p. 84e), remarking that Shakespeare 
doesn’t portray them “true to life” (emphasis in original). 
17 The phrase - but not the interpretation – is that of Glock (1996: 124-5). 
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gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise18] is the system of reference 
by means of which we interpret an unknown language. (PI § 206) 
All this includes both natural and nurtured behaviour. Moreover, as 
Glock and Baker & Hacker hold, even the cultural-specific is 
ultimately rooted in biology: 
[...] understanding an alien language presupposes convergence not of 
beliefs, but of patterns of behaviour, which presuppose common 
perceptual capacities, needs and emotions [...] we “could not find our 
feet” with a community of human beings who give no expression or 
feeling of any kind, and we would presumably be at a loss with 
spherical Martians (Glock 1996: 128). 
Shared human behaviour provides the essential leverage for 
understanding mankind. This “shared behaviour” is not only the 
common behaviour of mankind which manifests our animal nature, 
our natural needs for food, drink, warmth, our sexual drives, our 
physical vulnerability, etc. It also includes the culturally specific 
forms of behaviour shared by members of the tribe – their specific 
forms of social behaviour – observation of which and interaction 
with which enables us to interpret their language [...] any “form of 
life” accessible to lions, given their natural repertoire of behaviour 
and their behavioural dispositions, is too far removed from ours 
for any noises they might emit to count as speech (Baker and 
Hacker 2009:173, inc. n. 1; see also 218ff.)19 
In PI § 241, Wittgenstein writes: 
it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in 
opinions but in forms of life. 
There is an instructing parallel between what Wittgenstein is saying 
here and what Rush Rhees writes about understanding in his notes 
on Wittgenstein: 
                                                          
18 See von Savigny (1991:113–14) for an account of why Anscombe’s rendition of this 
phrase as “the common behaviour of mankind” is problematic. 
19 In this revised version of Baker and Hacker (1985:186–187), “shared behavior” has 
substituted what was previously “common behavior” throughout, thereby making it 
clearer that the common behaviour of humanity does not completely exhaust our shared 
behaviour, which also includes behaviour that is “culturally specific” (the term helpfully 
replaces what was previously described as “the diverse species-specific forms which such 
behaviour may naturally take for human beings”). 
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The misunderstandings of human beings are not simply fights or 
antipathies, and falling out in that sense (2006: 148-9). 
Just as to share a language is not to agree in the thoughts one 
expresses in it, so to have a shared understanding is not to agree in 
matters of fact. A friendship or professional relationship might end 
because the parties involved understand one another only too well. By 
the same token, two people may completely fail to understand each 
other despite a deep agreement in opinions, as in Jane Austen’s 
Pride and Prejudice which nicely illustrates that one’s failure to 
understand is not always free from ethical judgement. 20 
Understanding cannot be achieved through the mere acquisition of 
information. Rhees continues: 
If they were, there would be no problem. Criticisms and questions and 
objections […] that is not the sort of bewilderment that comes into 
misunderstandings between friends. As though there were something 
which somebody could tell you, although he has not. Or as though the 
want of understanding came from a want of intelligence […] They 
cannot understand what is being said: they cannot understand one 
another. Those two are pretty well equivalent here. (Ibid)21 
The “what is said” at issue here is not the “what is said” of 
expression (or even of utterance) meaning but that of speaker 
meaning. I may understand your words perfectly well but 
completely fail to get what you are saying. This need not be a 
(mere) failure to grasp the intended conversational implicatures, as 
opposed to the conventional meaning. 22  Deeper failures to 
understand occur when the very spirit of what one is saying is 
missed. Whether or not this can be explained with additional 
information depends on how much else in life is already shared.23  
                                                          
20 See Hertzberg (2005: 8ff.) for cases where “[m]y not understanding is bound up with 
my finding the activity abhorrent.” Hertzberg concludes that “In saying that I find 
someone’s behaviour incomprehensible, what I am saying, roughly, is that an appropriate 
attitude towards it is impossible to find” (ibid.:14). 
21 For more on the distinction between understanding and agreement see Klagge (2011: 
41ff.). 
22 Jennifer Saul helpfully distinguishes between “constrained” (overt) and “unconstrained” 
(contextualist) understandings of what is said (2012:27ff.). 
23
 The tone in which one says something is important here: try telling a dog “good boy” in 
a harsh voice or “bad boy” in a pleasant one and see the confusion that ensues. This is 
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Pari passu, one cannot fully understand what one has said if one 
doesn’t understand why she said it (cf. Collingwood 1946: 177 & 
Anscombe 1957: §46) and not in the sense which can be easily 
addressed with a statement about one’s reasons, or causal 
generalisations which might enable future predictions: 
So he gets angry, when we see no reason for it; what excites us leaves 
him unmoved.--Is the essential difference that we can't foresee his 
reactions? Couldn't it be that after some experience we might know 
them, but still not be able to follow him? (LW § 192) 
Hence the idea, common in relationship breakdowns such as that 
between Wittgenstein and Sraffa, that if it turns out that the other 
person never understood something that mattered deeply to 
oneself, all other communication must have ultimately been 
illusory, or at best skin deep. This can be true of even the most 
mundane things, such as the example Alan Bennett gives of his 
father not caring about good pepper.  
The understanding we have of another person’s life cannot be 
reduced to propositional knowledge that can be understood by 
someone who doesn’t already have enough in common with the 
person in question. My “getting” you may enable me to pass on 
knowledge about you in propositional form, but the information I 
pass on won’t on its own lead others to also understand you.24 Our 
understanding of another cannot be fully captured in propositional 
form (see Beardsmore 1996: 54), no more than our understanding 
of jazz could.25  The failure to understand another is not a failure to 
reach consensus on some factual or moral matter, any more than 
understanding is a matter of agreement. What is missing, it would 
seem, is forms of life. (Wittgenstein’s lion remark provides a 
                                                                                                                                                                        
why the philosophical enterprise of reducing meaning to “propositional content” is 
doomed to fail.  
24 It would be a mistake to think that if understanding is some kind of non-propositional 
knowledge then it is a form of know-how à la Ryle. In many cases it is a know who, know 
what, or know why (see also note 3 above).  
25  A similar point is made by Tilghman (1983). I consider Wittgenstein’s views on 
understanding art in Sandis (forthcoming).  
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limiting case of a more general difficulty). The barrier to sharing 
forms of life is not metaphysical or even biological but biographical.26 
It is tempting to conclude from all this that communication is 
made possible, perhaps even results from, the prior existence of 
shared forms of life. Rhees denies this outright: 
[…] you cannot say that it is because they have a common life that 
they are able to engage in conversation … It is because of its 
connexion with the rest of the language that any of their utterances is 
connected with what they are doing. (Rhees 2006: 130) 
Rhees’ point is that forms of life don’t function as part of a 
linear explanation for how conversation and understanding (what is 
said) is possible. By the same token, a failure to understand cannot 
simply be attributed (as Wittgenstein seems to do in his letter to 
Sraffa) to a lack of shared lives. For the two-way act of attempting 
to understand the other and be understood is an attempt to bring 
the other into one’s life and/or to enter the life of another. This is 
no more than to make a start, of course, and some starts can be 
false. But it would be most bizarre if one couldn’t even begin to 
understand another unless there already existed a shared form of 
life in the strong cultural sense (Wittgenstein is hardly denying that 
he and Sraffa shared certain biological needs). There must surely 
exist points of entrance.27    
In his book Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation 
Jonathan Lear describes the reluctance of Frank B. Linderman to 
say that he knows much about “the Indian” despite the fact that he 
had “studied him” for more than forty years and had been told by 
his own subject that he had “felt his heart” (Lear 2006: 2). Lear’s 
book centres around the possibility that when Indian chief Plenty 
Coups stated that “nothing happened” after the buffalo went away 
he meant this in a literal way that we (non Indians) cannot begin to 
comprehend. Lear writes:  
                                                          
26  Of course biographical knowledge in no way guarantees understanding. If it were 
otherwise, self-understanding would be relatively easy to achieve, and autobiographies 
would be a testament to this. 
27
 Hence the following remark by Rhees: “‘Learning to speak’ and ‘learning to understand 
people’– those seem to go together’”(Ibid.: 139). 
Constantine Sandis  CC-BY 
 148 
I cannot pretend to say with confidence what Plenty Coups really 
meant. His remark is enigmatic in part because it is compatible with so 
many different interpretations. Some of them are superficial; others 
delve to the heart of the human condition. (Ibid.: 5) 
An even more radical example may be found in Matt 
Groening's Futurama. Two aliens from the planet Omicron Persei 8 
watch an episode of the human television series Friends, laughing at 
all the jokes. When it is over, one of them says to the other, in 
English: “Why does Ross, the largest friend, not simply eat the 
other five?” This particular joke focuses on a collective species, but 
it also holds true of both sub-species collectives and individuals 
that we may – up to a point – understand their bodily and speech 
acts with limited knowledge of how these fit into their wider lives.  
IV. Knowledge and Understanding 
Writing about her friendship with Wittgenstein, Elizabeth 
Anscombe makes the following contrast between knowledge and 
understanding: 
I must confess that I feel deeply suspicious of anyone’s claim to have 
understood Wittgenstein. That is perhaps because, although I had a 
very strong and deep affection for him, and, I suppose, knew him well, 
I am very sure that I did not understand him. (Anscombe, in 
Engelmann 1967: xiv) 
This might have been what the young Wittgenstein had in mind, 
for example, when at the end of his 1929 PhD Viva in Cambridge 
he allegedly told Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore ‘‘I know you’ll 
never understand it”, a suspicion which strengthened as his work 
became more popular. This leads him to announce in the Preface 
to the Investigations that he “could not help noticing that the results 
of [his own] work ... were ... frequently misunderstood”,28 and he 
has also been quoted as having maintained that Ryle was one of 
just two philosophers who understood his work (Monk 1991:436). 
In a similar vein, he told Russell that Frege “doesn’t understand a 
                                                          
28 If understanding the expression meaning of what anybody says were always sufficient 
for understanding the person there would be minimal need for exegesis.  
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single word of my work” (letter dated 6 Oct 1919; McGuinness 
2012: 67, p.103), and a few years later: 
I must confess that the number of people to whom I can talk is 
constantly diminishing. (letter c. April 1922; McGuinness 2012: 94, 
pp.132-3) 
It is a mistake to think of these as instances of arrogance, for 
Wittgenstein’s insistence that others cannot understand him is 
accompanied by a similar pessimism about his ability to understand 
others. This manifests itself in the fear that it only seems to him that 
he understands things and people precisely because he doesn’t in 
fact understand much at all: 
Is my understanding [Verständnis] only blindness to my own lack of 
understanding [Unverständnis]? It often seems so to me (OC 418). 
James C. Klagge (2011) explains this phenomenon by arguing that 
Wittgenstein was simply out of place (and in some sense exiled 
from an earlier era) in the 20th century. 
It is in the light of all this, that we must take note of fact that he 
says ‘me’ rather than ‘my work’ at the crucial moment of the 
Tractatus: 
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: he who 
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he 
has used them – as steps – to climb up beyond them. (TLP 6.54)  
In what way might the inability to understand a speaking lion 
differ from the inability to understand Wittgenstein when he 
speaks? “[I]t is very unlikely that we will understand and appreciate 
Wittgenstein’s work”, Klagge writes, “unless we have the right 
temperament and sensibility” (2011: 39). 
Understanding comes in degrees, but we have already seen that 
the private Wittgenstein is working with a relatively demanding 
notion of understanding. This is further evidenced by his incredibly 
high personal standards for every aspect of life (see Monk 1991). 
Of course feeling that we will never understand some people is 
compatible with in principle being able to do so (even if we never 
come to manage it). A well-known philosopher once confessed to 
me that Russell does not speak to him. By this he did not mean that 
he could not understand any individual sentence but, rather, that he 
Constantine Sandis  CC-BY 
 150 
doesn’t share the sort of interests required to find his feet with 
what Russell was generally trying to get it. Such reactions need not 
be negative ones: 
I could only stare in wonder at Shakespeare; never do anything with 
him. (CV, p. 84/94e; 1950) 
Perhaps this was the situation that Wittgenstein eventually felt 
he found himself in with Sraffa. 
Epilogue 
I have tried to show that the tension between the public 
Wittgenstein’s optimism about knowledge of other minds and the 
private Wittgenstein’s pessimism about understanding (and being 
understood by) others, including those closest to him, is not a 
problematic one. There are three related reasons for this. First, the 
barriers he sought to destroy were metaphysical (allegedly 
necessary) ones, whereas those he struggled to overcome were 
psychological (presumably contingent). Second, Wittgenstein’s 
official “nothing is hidden” view is chiefly about knowledge while the 
unofficial one is about understanding, and it is part of his larger 
project to demonstrate that the latter cannot be reduced to the 
former. Last, Wittgenstein’s official remarks on understanding 
themselves fall into two distinct categories that do not neatly match 
the focus of his unofficial ones. One set is comprised of those 
remarks near the beginning of the Investigations that challenge the 
thought that understanding is an inner mental process 
accompanying behavior such as speaking and reading. The other 
consists primarily of the famous “tribes and lions” passages in PPF 
and On Certainty concerned with the difficulty of understanding 
others without immersing oneself into their form of life. Here the 
problem is cultural or sociological, and Wittgenstein hits a mean 
between optimism and pessimism. In its unofficial counterpart, 
Wittgenstein focuses on individual people, rather than collectives, 
and is much less optimistic about success, not least because he sets 
the bar for understanding those closest to him so high that he may 
appear not to acknowledge that understanding is a matter of degree 
rather than kind (though, in fact, he writes of an “almost complete 
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lack of understanding”). The official and the unofficial sets of 
remarks are here united in assuming a distinction between 
understanding a person and understanding the (expression or 
utterance) meaning of their words. If to understand a language is to 
understand a form of life, then to understand a person is to 
understand a whole life.29 
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